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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Pursuant to RULE 3(a) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, a
final order of a Utah District Court may be appealed. Appellate
jurisdiction is conferred upon the Utah Court of Appeals pursuant to §782a-3(a)

UTAH CODE ANNOTATED

1953 as amended.

STATEMENT OF RELEVANT FACTS
1. According to Garth Lunt, trustee of the Plaintiff trust, the width of
the gate entering into Lunt property from the Lane was 10 feet. (R.
958 at 186).
2. Moneves Boren (Garth Lunt's sister) testified that on the day before
trial she measured the Lane and the length of the Lane "down to
where I figured it went across to the barn." (R. 958 at 67-68). The
barn had been removed 14 years prior in 1991. (R. 958 at 137).
3. Jack Lunt testified that on the day before trial he measured the Lane
"to where [he] believe[d] the barn was located. (R. 958 at 28-29).
4. Garth Lunt testified that on the day before trial he measured the
Lane to where he "believe[d] the Whitt barn and the gate was." (R.
958 at 186). The barn had been removed 14 years prior in 1991.

5. Garth Lunt testified that "someone" moved the gate 62 feet up
[eastward] to its current location. (R. 958 at 148). The Lane is 150
feet from 6th West to the gate's present location. (R. 958 at 183).
6. Regarding the type of historical use, Garth Lunt testified that the
Lane was used to take cattle and teams of horses up it and hay back
to the barn and machinery. (R. 958 at 134-135). The barn on the
Lunt (McNaughten) property was used for milk cows and to store
hay. (R. 958 at 160). The use of the Lane was not to access the back
apartment but to access an acre of ground that goes west. (R. 958 at
182-183).
7. The Lunt property was subdivided such that the house is now on a
1.2 acre parcel. (R. 958 at 161). The McNaughton barn was
removed in approximately 1991. (R. 958 at 137). Garth Lunt
considered the Lane as mutual property with the Lance predecessors,
the Witts. (R. 958 at 151).
8. According to Jack Lunt, the willow tree would be close to the
boundary line on the McNaughton side. (R. 958 at 53). Originally
only a "basement house" was located on the north side of the Lane.
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(R. 958 at 26).The Witts had a shed, cellar and fence on the Lane's
South boundary. (R. 958 at 31).
9. Jack Lunt remembered going through a gate that went down through
the corral on the Lance (formerly Witt) property that he would go
through the gate and back into the Lunt property. (R. 958 at 30).
10.

The gate to the Lunt barn is 10-12 feet wide.(R. 958 at 41).

11.

Regarding the length of the easement, Jack Lunt testified that
from 6th West to the Witt barn was approximately 240-260 feet. A
fence ran along the South side of the Lane about 151 feet. (R. 958 at
5). It was between 164-247 feet to the Witt barn from 6th West. (R.
958 at 27-28). The Lane terminated about 164 feet deep from the 6th

West. (R. 958 at 27). It was about 240 feet to the barn from 6th
West. (R. 958 at 28). The wooden fence from the Witt property
corner would be about 160-162 feet (R. 958 at 38). The South side
of the Lane is 175 feet back from asphalt to the fence. It would have
been approximately 62 feet more to the Witt's barn. (R. 958 at 41).
12.

Regarding the historical use of the easement, Jack Lunt

testified the Lane was used for Lunt's predecessors and the Lances
predecessors to move equipment, mowing machines, delivery rakes
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from one place to another. (R. 958 at 14). Jack Lunt recalled going
through the gate in the Lane to feed the calves he had weaned. He
also took a bob sleigh and a wagon down the lane. (R. 958 at 30).
There is no longer a gate to get through to go north from the Lane
onto the Lunt property - "Somebody made that a fence." (R. 958 at
44). There was no other use of the Lane by Jack Lunt other than to
bring hay machinery, milk cows, and a sleigh. (R. 958 at 51). Jack
Lunt saw the Witts (the Lances' predecessors) taking their horses
down the Lane to the Witts' pasture.
With regard to the historical use, Moneves Boren testified:
We used it down— to go down through there to park - down the
side of the law for we didn't have room in the front. Well, and
when the snow got deep in there we couldn't get out anyway. We
used it to park cars. In the summer we used it to take our hay back
to the barn. We used it to put cattle down in there and take them out
to take them to the north field, just the general use. (R. 958 at 64).
The barn on the Lunt property was used only for cattle and to store
hay. (R. 958 at 68). In the milk shed on the north side of the barn,
Moneves Boren Last milked in 1950. (R. 958 at 79). Both the
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According to defense witness Frank Pia, expert
photogrammetrist, from 6th West to the Witt barn was approximately
150-175 feet. (R. 959 at 322),

17.

Defense witness Duane Smith testified that the iengih oi me
easement was approximately 150-200 I eet from 6th West to where the
barn was located.
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18.

Regarding use of the easement, Duane Smith testified that only

the Witts (Lances' predecessors) used the lane. They had machinery
parked on both sides of it. (R. 959 at 255). There's about an eight
foot gate in between two big black willow trees north of the Lunt
house there. Said gate was North of where the house is now. (R. 959
at 261). The access way to the garage behind the Lunt house was
north of the house rather than south across the Lane. (R. 959 at
253).
19.

The concrete block building on the Lunt property has the

doors facing north. (R. 959 at 219).
20.

In 1988, Lunt first rented out the apartment (Exhibit 41) usage
changed from agricultural access to apartment access. (R. 959 at

242).
21.

During trial Judge Pullan stated "when I was the County
Attorney for Wasatch County I was consulted about a boundary line
issue. My recollection is in this general area. I have no recollection
with whom I talked." (R. 958). Counsel for Lances stated "My
clients have not been involved with you, they don't recognize you.
They don't recall anything like that." (R. 958). After the Bench
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S U M M A R Y OF T H E A R G U M E N T S
I.
Summary of Arguments in Response to Cross-Appeal
The Trial Court Properly Considered the Issue of
Abandonment but came to an improper conclusion.
It was proper for the trial court to apply the doctrine of abandonment
of easement to the present case. In the present case, facts an<
supporting abandonment were presented at ti ial ai id at i IC •
object to tl le e\ idei ic e :)i to ai iy ai gin i: lent discussed about abandonment
The issue v pas proper)

lo'ied b\ eoiiM/fil <>( (In; puriii "«. T

'

onh rrnii v. mi 11 ni ivo;inl io abandonment was that it foiled to recognize that
Lunt had entirely abandoned the driveway when it abandoned agricultural
use of the property. In establishing the width of the easement, Judge
Pullan used 20 feet based on Heber City zoning code for the standard
width of a driveway rather than the actual historic use of the Lane. The
Lane was no longer used for agricultural purposes and nau mcrefore been
abandoned.

II.

Summary of Arguments in Reply to Appellee's Brief.
The Lances were prejudiced by Judge Pullan 's prior experience with

the hunt's and the LunVs property while he served on the planning
commission. Judge Pullan should have been disqualified and a new trial
granted. The Lances requested the new trial as soon as they discovered the
conflict of interest. Fourth District Presiding Judge Taylor ruled that the
facts established "the appearance of impartiality" and ordered the
remainder of the case to be heard by Judge Schofield. It was improper to
not order a new trial under the circumstances where there was the
appearance of impartiality and actual prejudice resulted to the Lances.
The current use of the Lane is not consistent with historic use of the
Lane. The trial court ruled "After the death of Mr. McNaughten in 1980,
the McNaughtens' use of the lane for agricultural purposes declined
precipitously. At the time of Ms. McNaughten's death in 1984, that use
had ceased. From 1984 to the present, Plaintiff has used the lane only as a
driveway to allow tenants to access the rear of the McNaughten home and
its accessory apartment." (R. 726). The trial court erred by allowing
continued access to the rental apartment. Lunt has no prescriptive right to
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use the Lane to access this additional dwelling (that did not exist during the
prescriptive period).
The elements of prescriptive easement were not met, specifically with
regard to the current use. The trial court had found that Lunt began leasing
the apartment since "sometime between 1986 and 1988." (R. 732).
Insufficient time has passed to obtain a prescriptive easement with regard
to the apartment use. Use of the Lane to access the apartment improperly
increases the burden on servient estate thereby extinguishing or causing
abandonment of the easement.
ARGUMENTS IN RESPONSE TO BRIEF OF CROSS APPELLEE
INTRODUCTION
Lunt appeals two issues: 1) the trial court's application of abandonment
doctrine, and 2) the trial court's determination of the scope and
measurement of the abandoned prescriptive easement. The trial court
properly determined that the doctrine of abandonment applied to the case.
Both parties submitted relevant evidence of and tried the matter, if not by
express consent, by implied consent. The scope and measurement of the
abandoned prescriptive easement was not properly found by the trial court.
The trial court found that a prescriptive easement had existed for such use
and also that Lunt had abandoned a portion of the Lane that ran on the
13

Lance property. The Lances maintain that the finding of prescriptive
easement was error and alternatively that Lunt had abandoned all of the
Lane on the Lance property. If a prescriptive easement was established, it
was only established for the acquired agricultural use. Because Lunt
abandoned the agricultural use of his property, on which the prescriptive
right is based, he has also abandoned the right to use the Lane.

I.

Whether the Trial Court Erred in Ruling on the Issue of
Abandonment.

Lunt claims that that the issue of abandonment was not properly before
the trial court. The issue of abandonment was clearly within the
framework of evidence presented. It was not necessary to even move to
amend pleadings to conform to the evidence. "The parties' failure to move
to amend the pleadings to conform to the evidence does not affect the fact
that those issues were in fact tried by the consent of the parties and were
therefore properly before the court. The rule is long-standing that the
parties to a lawsuit are entitled to the relief the evidence shows they
deserve regardless of whether they have requested such relief." Clark v.
Second Circuit Court, 741 P.2d 956, 957-958 (Utah, 1987). Citing Mabey
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v. Kay Peterson Construction Co., 682 P.2d 287, 289 (Utah 1984);
Poulsen v. Poulsen, 672 P. 2d 97, 99 (Utah 1983); General Insurance Co.
of America v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502, 506 (Utah 1976);
Holdaway v. Hall, 29 Utah 2d 77, 505 P.2d 295 (1973).
Lunt cites Combe v. Warren's family Drive-Inns Inc., for the premise
that it is error for a trial court to grant relief on issues not raised or tried
before it. 680 P.2d 733, 735 (Utah 1984). The Combe decision is clearly
distinguishable from the present case: In Combe, "The trial court
fashioned its findings from whole cloth. He declared a corporation in good
standing a partnership and then proceeded to dissolve it when neither party
had sought that relief. He distributed the assets of that corporation without
following the statutory procedure in cases of involuntary dissolution. The
judgment rendered was captioned a declaratory judgment, but no
declaratory relief had been sought." Id. Here, clear evidence of
abandonment was presented, much of it by Cross Appellant Lunt. Combe
does not preclude the trial court's use of abandonment.
Rule 54(c)(1) requires trial courts to be liberal in awarding appropriate
relief justified by the facts developed at trial, as long as the failure to
request a particular form of relief does not prejudice a party in the
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preparation or trial of the case. If there is no prejudice, it is necessary only
that the relief granted be supported by the evidence and be a permissible
form of relief for the claims litigated. (Utah R. Civ. Proc. 54 (c) (1),
Cowley v. Porter, 127 P.3d 1224, 1232 (Utah Ct. App.2005), citing
Henderson v. Fore-Shor Co., 757 P.2d 465, 472 Utah Ct. App. 1988).
Lunt was not prejudiced. Lunt made no objection at trial when the
issue of abandonment was raised. Lunt made no objection at trial when
evidence and testimony establishing abandonment was received. Lunt
made no post-trial motion with regard to the issue. Although Lunt claims
that he was "unable to address the legal issues of abandonment, actual
relinquishment of the Lane and the intent to abandon," evidence of all of
these matters was heard by the trial court -much of it introduced by Lunt.
Lunt introduced evidence regarding the time period of use, nature of use,
and dimensions of the alleged prescriptive easement -all of which
constitute defenses to the theory of abandonment of the easement. Garth
Lunt specifically testified regarding abandonment -that the gate had been
removed and the fence had been "moved up" leaving the lane 150 feet
long. (R. 958 at 148, also at 183). Jack Lunt testified that no action had
been taken re-install the gate or remove the fence or otherwise get through
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it. (R. 958 at 44). These facts go beyond mere non-user. These facts are
evidence of intent to abandon.
Here, where issues and defenses of abandonment were presented, the
issues were tried by the implied consent of the parties. It is not error to
grant relief where the issues are tried by the express or implied consent of
the parties. See Poulsen v. Poulsen, 672 P.2d 97, 99 (Utah 1983). Only
on appeal does Lunt claim to be surprised or prejudiced by the issue of
abandonment. It was proper for the trial court to apply the doctrine of
abandonment. Therefore, the Lances respectfully request that this Court
affirm the trial court's application of the doctrine of abandonment.
II.

Whether the Trial Court Committed Clear Error regarding
the Scope and Measurement of the Abandonment of the
Prescriptive Easement.

The trial court did not err in applying the doctrine of abandonment.
The issue of abandonment was properly before the trial court. The trial
court only erred when it found an all purpose year-round easement because
the evidence at trial showed that the Lunt use of the Lane was only for
occasional agricultural purposes over the years and that when the
agricultural use had stopped, the easement use became abandoned.
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Lunt cites numerous cases for the proposition "[A] right gained by
conveyance may not be lost by non-use alone and that an actual intent to
abandon be evident." Western Gateway Storage Co. v. Treseder, 567 P.2d
181, 182 (Utah 1977). "Proof of abandonment of such an easement
requires action releasing the ownership and the right to use with clear and
convincing proof of an intentional abandonment. This requires that
plaintiffs ceased to use this easement to irrigate their land with the intention
to make no further use of it." Harmon v. Rasmussen, 375 P.2d 762, 765
(Utah 1962). "[A] servitude easement is extinguished by any obstruction
of a permanent nature by the party himself to whom the servitude is due
(or by his consent), or by the voluntary acquisition or acceptance of any
other right or privilege incompatible with the exercise or enjoyment of it;
and (2) that being once lost it is gone forever, and can never be revived but
by a new grant." Brown v. Ore. Short Line R. Co., 102 P. 740, 743 (Utah
1909). (internal citations omitted). The Brown decision went on to explain
that "that all the dwellings and other buildings, as well as the trees situated
on the several parcels of land to which the easement was appurtenant, have
been removed and that the several parcels of land as well as the strip are
now being, and will continue to be, used for an entirely different purpose
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which is incompatible with the original purpose for which the easement
was created-we are of the opinion that the easement has been abandoned
and has become extinguished..." In short, Brown establishes that where
easement was originally granted for a certain use (in Brown, egress to
residential dwellings), when a new use of the easement comes into being
that is incompatible with the original easement, abandonment and
extinguishment occurs. All witnesses testified that the use of the driveway
was limited to agricultural use -and parking of cars appurtenant to the
original dwelling. As in Brown, Lunt's property was put to new use that
extinguished the original easement. The only use of the driveway by Lunt
since approximately 1988, was for access to a rental apartment in the rear
of the dwelling. (R. 726, 732). The barn was entirely removed by 1991.
Lunt further subdivided the original 5 acre parcel, leaving only a 1.2 acre
parcel that is zoned for residential use. As the agricultural income from
property declined, Lunt generated income from rents of the apartment and
the original dwelling house.
The use of the easement for daily residential egress related to the
apartment is distinct and incompatible with the occasional use for

movement of cattle, hay and farm equipment. Therefore the entire Lane
was abandoned by Lunt.
Abandonment is also met where there is evidence of adverse use by
the owner of the servient estate is acquiesced in by the owner of the
dominant estate for a period of time suffficient to establish a prescriptive
right. See Id. The evidence shows rather clearly that Lunt had no intent to
continue the use of the Lane because he had no intent to continue the
agricultural use of the Lunt property. All dairy operations stopped in
1980. The barn, that was used to store the hay in support of the dairy and
cattle operations was completely removed in 1991. Lunt subdivided the
original parcel and retains only 1.2 acres of it. On the remaining 1.2 acre
parcel Lunt sought and obtained a zone change to residential use over the
front portion. Fencing was placed and a gate removed without objection
from Lunt. The Lances request this Court to grant relief by upholding the
trial court's finding of abandonment and by recognizing that the entire
driveway was abandoned.
III.

Whether the Trial Court Erred by Limiting the Length and
Width of the Easement.
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Although it was proper for the trial court to apply the doctrine of
abandonment, it did not make a proper application. The trial court found
abandonment of certain length and width of the Lane, but it should have
found a complete abandonment based on a change in use of the Lane.
The measure and limit of a prescriptive easement is determined by
the use made of it during the prescriptive period. See McBride v.
McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 997 (Utah 1978). The testimony regarding use of
the Lane from all witnesses was that it was limited to agricultural uses and the occasional parking of cars. Any change in the use of the dominant
estate that increases the burden on the Lane causes an extinguishment or
abandonment of the prescriptive easement. "[I]f the easement arises by
prescription, a change in the dominant estate calling for a burden upon the
servient land exceeding that devolving upon it by its customary use during
the prescriptive period, if the increased use is inseparable from the former
use, will operate an extinguishment of the easement." Ellis v. Simmons,
619 S.E.2d 88, 91 (Va.,2005), citing Frederick D.G. Ribble, Minor on
Real Property § 110, at 150 (2d ed.1928); see also Wood v. Ashby, 253
P.2d 351, 354 (Utah 1952), citing 28 C.J.S., Easements, § 65(b), p. 732.
Here, Lunt created an additional dwelling on his property, an accessory
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rental apartment. This increased the burden on the Lane as the apartment
renters desired and did use it. This increased use and burden by the
apartment "operate[d] an extinguishment of the easement." Id. Merely
placing a gate across an easement is an increased burden. See McBride v.
McBride, 581 P.2d 996, 998 (Utah 1978), see also Kunzler v. O'DelU 855
P.2d 270 (Utah Ct. App. 1993). The placement and use of an additional
residence is an increased burden such that the easement has been
extinguished.
CONCLUSION
With regard to the Cross Appeal, the Lances request this Court to
Deny Lunt's Cross Appeal in its entirety and specifically, affirm the trial
court's conclusion that the easement, if such is found, was abandoned.
The trial court's conclusions regarding the limited scope of the
abandonment should be reversed, and under the facts presented at trial, it
should be found that the entire easement was abandoned and extinguished.

ARGUMENTS IN REPLY
The Lances Were Prejudiced and Moved to Disqualify the Trial Judge
at the Earliest Opportunity.

22
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"when I was the County Attorney for Wasatch Count) 1 was t msulted
about a boundary line issue. My recollection is in this general area, I
have no recollection with whom I talked." (JR. 958). on the morning of the
trial, was too vague to raise any concerns about Judge Pullan's bias. He
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sister, testified before the Heber City Planning Commission and aiaain .ii
trial. Judge Pullan's prior dealings with the Lunt propeil\ and Moivws
Boren form the basis for Judge Pullan's bias against the Lances.
The appearance of bias is grounds for reversal where actual
prejudice is show n

| A | trial judge's failure to recuse based on the

appealance of (Via? tna\ he giounds tor reversal if actual prejudice is
shown." Starr v. Alonzo, ()73 P.2d (>"o. ^"s' 11 'talo i*>*>S». citing State v.
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Gardner, 789 P.2d 273, 278 (Utah 1989), cert, denied, 494 U.S. 1090,
110 S.Ct. 1837, 108 L.Ed.2d 965 (1990). "Actual prejudice can be shown
when there exists a reasonable likelihood that the result would have been
more favorable for the defendants absent the trial judge's appearance of
bias." Id. The Lances were actually prejudiced based on Judge Pullan's
bias from his prior experience with the property. The connection between
the zoning issues before Judge Pullan and the litigation shows bias: Lunt
stated, for zoning purposes that the Lane ran 150 feet from the road to a
gate. At trial, Judge Pullan ruled that the easement was 150 feet long,
based on the location of the alleged gate. There was minimal testimony
given regarding when this new gate was established or how long it had
been used. In establishing the width of the easement, Judge Pullan used 20
feet based on Heber City zoning code for the standard width of a driveway
rather than the actual historic use of the Lane. Based on this showing of
bias and actual prejudice, the findings should be reversed and a new trial
granted.
The Elements for a Prescriptive Easement Were Not Met For the
Current Use.
Lunt's property is no longer used as an agricultural enterprise. The
trial court found "After the death of Mr. McNaughten in 1980, the
24
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762-773). Lunt does not seek to continue to use (he 1 ane to reach its hani
(which was removed in 1991), or to move cattle or hay or agricultural
equipment. Rather, Lunt seeks an easement to allow the daily use of the
Lane for ingress and egress to a rental apartment that never existed as a
separate dwelling during the prescriptive period, and potentially the further
development of his property. Ingress and egress to the
rental apai tnieiil lias testified in a drastic change in the use of the easement
af' \\Ml as ;i drasli' increase MI lie lunden PII (he servient estate, The
servient estate can "n'\

fi

subjected to (he easement lo Hie extent lo wlneli

the easement was acquired, and (lie easement owner cannol change tliis use
so as to put any greater burden upon the servient estate." V/<'/>•<>// v.
Sandberg, 105 Utah 93, 141 P.2d 696, 701 (Utah 1943). "A right of way
for one purpose gained by user cannot be turned into a right of way for
another purpose if the latter adds materially to the burden of the servient
estate, and ihe right denied irom user can never outrun or exceed the user
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in which it had its origin." American Bank-Note Co. v. New York El. R.
Co., 129 N.Y. 252, 29 N.E. 302, 305 (N.Y. 1891); Ryan v. Mississippi
Valley S. I. R. Co., 62 Miss. 162 (1884); Richardson v. Pond, supra;
Jones on Easements, Sec. 291. The use during the prescriptive period is
the only indication of the nature and extent of the right acquired. Turner v.
Hart, 71 Mich. 128, 38 N.W. 890, 15 Am.St.Rep. 243 (Mich. 1888).
There was no rental apartment on the property during the prescriptive
period. The rental apartment use began "between 1986 and 1988." (R.
732). Having an additional dwelling on the property materially increases,
doubles, the use of the Lane. Because such a material increase in the
burden on the easement is improper, and because the prescriptive period
for use with regard to the rental apartment has not run, the elements for
prescriptive easement with regard to ingress and egress to the rental
apartment have not been met and the trial court should be reversed in this
regard.
The Current Use of the Easement Is Not Consistent with Historic Use.
Lunt claims that the evidence established that during the prescriptive
period the Lane was used for "residential and agricultural purposes."
Cross Appeal p. 25. There is no mention in the record of the words
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"residential purpose '

Uh) il "n \

u

,. iesidential" use, it would

necessarily he limitnl in ihr <>nl\ tc'sidtitu1") ilul existed duiing the
prescriptive period. The residen:

^ _ o

longer exists. The residence that stood on ilin: I ,um pmpi-rh ivniamix hut
the original Lunt parcel has been subdivided and an aecrsson rental
apartment added. There can be no proper use of the prescriptive easenvnl
area to serve any other dwelling than existed during the prescriptive
period. It must follow that there is no prescriptive right for Lunt to use the
Laik' u» acLL-y. the rental apartment he built in the back of the original
dwllm!'
The irinl i mirl loiinJ llial iUc piiihes ' |ointl\ used the Lane to access
their acreage, run vi\\\\r h:m| 11,i;\, , nim r I'ami ei|uipincni and park cars as
often as either found it necessan and coiiv^ninit " H n / \v.

I lie uial

court found that the Lane was not used to access 1 ,unt' s lental jparnneiit
until "between 1986 and 1988." (R. 732j. The trial court did n Lunt could allowr his renters to use the Lane. Access to this additional
dwelling would "place a greater burden or servitude on the [Lance]
pmpem " 11 IM 11 allowed, \iclson r. Sandberg, 141 P.2d 696, 701 (Utah
1 :-

.•» access any other dwelling is an additional
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burden and is beyond the scope of the alleged prescriptive easement. It is
further improper to allow placement of any utilities in the Lane as there
have never been utilities in the Lane at any time. The trial court's
statement that the driveway could potentially be used for "utility
easements" was improper and must be specifically reversed because such
use is clearly outside the scope of the prescriptive easement. See R. 960 at
8.
Lunt claims that the case "was brought before the trial court as Mr.
Lunt sought to continue to use the Lane to access the rear portion of his
acreage, that can only be accessed by traversing the Lane." Appellee's
Brief, p. 27. Lunt's claim mischaracterizes and misstates the record. The
Lunt property allegedly served by the Lane was a five acre parcel with one
dwelling. (R. 958 at 161). At trial, testimony was given by Duane Smith,
that there was no use of the Lane by Lunt's predecessors for the 2-3 year
period of time during which he worked for Lunt's predecessors and the
access he used to the property was on the North side of the Lunt property,
not the South side where the Lane is. (R. 259 at 249-250). Frank Pia, the
photogrametry expert, further testified that based on the aerial photographs
of the Lane and the Lunt property show the increasing use of the North
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side nf thr hii

| "npciiv to access ihe hum in the back, k, 1?9 at 308).

There w;r, about IT s'l'h1 loot gate in between two big black willow trees
north of the Lunt dwell:• -

. e garage

behind the Lunt house was north ot ilr \\nwr iritlin (ban souih across the
Lane. (R. 959 at 253). The trial court found "The ! t r 7 u aerial phonograph
shows a large access road to the McNaughten property , Mi Pia testified
that the photograph depicted regular use of this road. The road
commences at a point approximately 150 feet north of the lane. It runs
west from 600 West, then cuts southwest to the NcNaughten barn." (R.
733)

In si toil I lie record shows that Lunt could, and did, access the rear

p<HIi" >u \h ins [M< tf »'.• 11;, 1w means other than the Lane. Lunt had, and
eonfinti'w t" h;i\e .inipl- • means of access lo the rear portion of his parcel
across his own land

II I! urn has an access pioMejii, he created il himself

by Ms method of subdividing his properh

I he original duelling is now

on a 1.2 acre parcel. (R. 958 at 161). After subdividim: the original
parcel, a separate dwelling was constructed directly north of the original
dwelling on another portion of the original parcel.
CONCLUSION
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In light of the facts and arguments set forth, Appellants the Lances
continue to request that this Court reverse the judgment and order of the
trial court herein and find that a prescriptive easement was not established
over the Lances' property, or otherwise remand this for new trial or
further proceedings before a new judge consistent with Utah law. With
regard to the Cross Appeal, the Lances request this Court to deny the
Cross Appeal in its entirety, or alternatively to affirm the trial court's
conclusion that the easement was abandoned but reverse the trial court's
conclusions regarding the limited scope of the abandonment and find,
under the facts presented at trial, that the entire easement has been
abandoned and extinguished.
DATED this 15th day of August, 2007.
TESCH LAW OFFICES, P.C.

^haw^W. Potter
Attorneys for the Lances
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

I hereby certify that I caused a true and correct copy <M \fo* foregoing
Reply Brief and Brief of Cross Appellees Harold and Diane Lance, to be
sent by United States Mail, postage prepaid, on this

15*

day of

August, . • . a- i-.'iunvs:

Randy B. Birch
BOSTWICK & PRICE
139 East South Temple # 320
Salt Lake Cin- T T T S U I H
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r^ifeRandy B. Birch #04197
BOSTWICK& PRICE, P.C.
One Thirty Nine East
South Temple St., Suite 320
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-961-7400
Facsimile: 801-961-7406
AtionwYS for PI ami if] Garth Limt, Trustee of the Garth Q. hunt revocable Trust
IN THE FOURTH. JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF U'l All
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GARTH LUNT, trustee oi the GARTII
O. LUNT REVOCABLE TRUST,
FINDINGS,
ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil. No.

HAROLD LANCE, and DIANE LANCE
and Does 1-10,

Judge:

020500612

DEREk 1'

IMLLAN

Defendants,

The above captioned *•. .»•'•

•*

:

trial on November 1, and 29

2wu.:, .i ixw Plaintiff was pr^seiu. s> and through iis trustee Garth Lunt and represented by its
attorneys of record, BOSIWICI; & PRI«;T~,, P.C., tin: DeJeiidumh were present and represented
In Chris ijreenwood. The Court having previously made it fmdings and conclusions in its
Memorandum Decision dated November 23, 2005, the same are incorporated herein.
Based thereon, the Court orders as follows:
A prescriptive easement for n driveway is cumimied in the Plaintiff which
easement is twenty (20) feet wide and One Hundred and approximately eighty three (183) feet
IOI-L. 7 > J

sam- extending :""• T. ••-• .*- ••• - -''::"-

'.•••- -:.,: -, :i..: .-.: n. .. , ^ : ; r : : direction

tuo.-L .:;.- .*\;;;; Mu, c,i J. n;-;^ iocated at 2\)> fv 600 West, lieber Cii}, U:ah? and going

nflY"^d"^UUD J UL U0'40 nil 4

i / i b u i L o ^uui «

approximately 183 feel to the current location of the fence which was formerly a gate and
which runs north and south at approximately 183 feet west of the center of 600 West street in
Heber City, Utah. The easement is more particularly described as follows:
See the attached Exhibit "A".
2.

A certified copy of this Order shall be recorded with the Wasatch County

Recorder's office.
3.

The Plaintiffs claims of boundary by acquiescence are dismissed.

4.

Whereas this is an easement that is confirmed in the Plaintiff, Plaintiff is

entitled to use the easement as any party would normally use a driveway. Defendants shall
not block access to the easement and shall remove forthwith any materials blocking or
obstructing the easement.
5.

Plaintiff shall pay the costs of preparing a legal description as necessitated by

the Court's ruling.
6.

Each party to pay their own attorney's fees.

7.

Plaintiff is awarded costs against the Defendant in the amount of $2,332.20,
DATED this

||

day of

fA&M

J^rekP,Pul4toL,
District Court Judge

KraigJ, Powell
Attorney for Defendants

-2-

2006,

, w*»

iivi

u^

>UKJ i l U U

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify than on April 26, 2006,1 consul ,i nut ,-mrl i oviw i copy ouiie
foregoing document en be
I X J mailed postage prepaid
[ ] faxed to No.
_ _ _
[ ] hand delivered
to*

KraigJ. Powell
TESCH LAW OFFICES
2 South Main Street, Suite 2-D
HeberCitv, I T 84032
^
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ATTACHMENT B

Randy B. Birch #04197
BOSTWICK & PRICE, P.C.
One Thirty Nine East
South Temple St., Suite 320
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: 801-961-7400
Facsimile: 801-961-7406
Attorneys for Plaintiff Garth hunt, Trustee of t lie uar;.

hunt Revocable Trust

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

RTH LUNT, trustee of the GAR
KJ. LUNT REVOCABLE TRUST.
1
Plaintiff,

M tier Denying Motion for New Trial or
n the Alternative to Amend Judgment
Anci/or Take Additional Testimony

:

:7 i i k » : 2

HAROLD LANCE, and DIANE LANCE
and Does 1-10,

Jud-c;

AN i HONY W. SCHOFIELD

Defendants.

The Defendants' Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative to Amend Judgment
and/or Take Additioi lal Testimoi \y cai i le before the court for hearing on L.dvoer 2". 2006, at
9:30 a.in. The Plaintiff was present by and through it? attorneys of record,
PRICE, ['" '

BOSTWICK

&

tin; Defendants wererepresent.ee D\ ivraig Poweh.

The Court having heard the argument of counsel, having reviewed the pleadings nnd
* ••. :.v ..-c: -\:., anu naving issued its Ruling on November 15, 2006, for the reasons set forth
therein, y ; S ordered that the Defendants' motion is der : -\ 3
J rhis

day of December, 2006.

Anthony W. Schofield
District Court Judge

•

^^v/
Kraig J. Powell
Attorney for Defendants

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify than on December 11^2006,1 caused a true and correct copy of the
foregoing document to be
^ ^ ^
[ ] faxed to No.
pi hand delivered

prepaid

to:
Kraig J. Powell
TESCH LAW OFFICES
2 South Main Street, Suite 2-D
Heber City, UT 84032
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Deputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
Garth Lunt,
Petitioner

:

Ruling

vs.

:

Date: May 3,2006

Harold Lance,

:

Case Number: 020500^ 12

:

Presiding Judge James R. /aylor

Respondent

This matter comes before the Court, sitting as a "reviewing judge" by certification from
the Honorable Derek Pullan as required by Rule 63(b)(2) following the receipt of an "Affidavit
for R tile 63 R emoval of Ji ldge" filed by the I 'etitioner.
Rule 63(b)(3)(A) requires this Court to determine if the motion and affidavit are timely
i; e_ ...L'j m ^v)v J .an;; a;,^ i^ii:\ sun^eni. L.ach requirement will be discussed.
Rule 63(b)(1)(A) states:
"A part}' to any action or the party's attorney may file a motion to
disqualify a judge. The motion shall be accompanied by a
certificate that the motion is filed in good faith and shall be
supported by an affidavit stating facts sufficient to show bias,
prejudice or conflict of interest."
[laic ()3ibli 1 ) \[-*>) slates lutihei that the motion must be tiled not later than 20 days after
the moving party discovered the grounds for the motion.
I his case was tried before Judge Pullan on November 1-2, 2005. Judge Pullan entered a
Ruling on November 23, 2005. Oral argi iment on objections to a proposed order from that ruling
Page

_L

'vJ _

was heard on February 16, 2006. In the middle of the first day of trial, November 1, 2005, Judge
Pullan noted, on the record, that "[i]n chambers I indicated that when I was the County Attorney
for Wasatch County, I was consulted about the boundary line issue. My recollection is in this
general area. I have no recollection with whom I talked." The parties made an affirmative
determination at that time that they had no concerns about a possible conflict of interest. The
Judge's ruling was that although the Plaintiff had failed to establish a boundary by acquiescence
the claim for a prescriptive easement had been established, in part. The Plaintiff was ordered to
obtain and pay the costs of a survey to identify the prescriptive easement. After oral argument on
February 16, 2006 the Court stated, further, that the easement was to be 20 feet in width and
measured from the center line of the street, east to 600 West. In early March, 2006, while doing
research to prepare the required easement on of the Defendants discovered that when Judge
Pullan was the Wasatch County Attorney in 1998 the property considered in this case was before
the Heber City Planning Commission for a requested zone change. Judge Pullan was the acting
chair of the commission when the commission recommended a zone change as requested by
Moneves Boren. Ms. Boren subsequently testified in the trial of this case.
This Court has carefully reviewed Judge Pullan's Ruling. He necessarily made extensive
findings of fact about the historic use and condition of the property from the late 1920's through
the present. The past, present or future zoning classification of the area was not considered or
relevant to his conclusion that from the 1930's through at least the mid-1970's there was open,

Page 2 of
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notorious, continuous and adverse use of the subject lane for more than 20 years to establish a .
prescriptive right in favor of the Plaintiff.
The first question raise J h} this motion is whether the requisite 2('! da) period began with
Judge?

•

^ * •• • : /

r. : • . . , _ v„ .r;

v. vnethe: ;ne period should begin when

Ms. Lance discovered that Judge Pullan served as acting chair of the Planning Commissi*;*

%A h

~ ^

a request io re-zone the property wras recommended in 1998. The focus of the Defendant's
complaint is not upon the substance of ,hid"c Pullnn's

IIIIHIL1

hut questions whothei there is an

appearance of impropriety because he was called upon to impartially consider the testimony of
1\ I • Hi nc\L the applicant in ik A mi- change and a witness during this trial. There is no
suggestion that Judge Pullan was other than candid and forthright when he declared at the time of
the inal that he had no recollection of any other involvement with the property. The zoning
hearing preceded the trial by more 1h;m sr\en years. Nevertheless, kaause Ihe question relates
to the common participation of Ms. Boren in both instances it is reasonable that the 20 day period
commence from when it uas discovered that Judge Pullan was involved in both proceedings.
This motion was filed on March 24, 2006 just nine days after Ms. Lance received the
documentation liom Heber City that indicated Judge Pullan's participation. The motion is.
therefore, timely.
I his motion is accompanied by the affidavit of Diana Lance. In paragraph 13 she states
"I am filing the accompanying Motion to 1 Jisqualiis based on a good-faith belief that the judge's

Paae 3 :>f
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impartiality in this matter can reasonably be questioned " The Court will accept this portion of
the affidavit as the requisite certification under the rule.
The unusual dilemma presented by this motion is that it does not seek to merely conclude
the prospective involvement of Judge Pullan, the moving party seeks a determination that a trail
already concluded was tainted and should be set aside. No specific references to the trial, written
ruling or subsequent proceedings have been made to demonstrate actual bias or prejudice. Rule
63 addresses the prospective involvement of a judge and is not intended to determine
proceedings already concluded. Questions about a trial already conducted and a ruling already
rendered must be determined by either the appellate process or through Rule 60, Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The moving party addresses only the appearance of impropriety. The available record is
that Judge Pullan had no recollection of the previous proceeding involving the same witness.
Nevertheless, this motion would, at the least, remind him of those proceedings. This Court
concludes that there may at least be an appearance of impropriety should he continue with the
case under these circumstances.
Accordingly, while this Court declines to set aside the trial or ruling of Judge Pullan, this
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niattci will be reassigned to Judge Anthony W. Schofield for such other proceedings as shall be
appropriate.
Dated this 3

judge James
Fourth/hidicial Di;
Copies of this Order mailed to:
Counsel for the Plaintiff:
Randy B. Birch
139 E. South Tempk. >ui;e :2i)
Salt Lake City, U;ah 8411 i
Counsel for the Defendants:
Kraig J. Powell
2 South Main Street, Suite 2-D
Heber City, Utah 84032
/?

Mailed this ,.</"

day of

&K

/ ••;

2006? postage pre-paid as noted above.
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4 T H DIS !K(Ce
STATE OF UTAH
UTAH COUNTY

TESCHUW OFFICES RC

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

GARTH LUNT, Trustee of the GARTH O.
LUNT REVOCABLE TRUST,

CASE NUMBER. 020500612
DATED. NOVEMBER 15, 2006

Plaintiff
RULING
vs.

ANTHONY W. SCHOFIELD, JUDGE
HAROLD LANCE and DIANA LANCE,
Defendants.

This matter comes before the court on defendants' motion for new trial, or m the
alternative to amend the judgment and/or take additional testimony. I have carefully read all
motions and memoranda and have considered the oral arguments presented m this matter. I now
deny defendants' motion
RULING
1.

Defendants Do Not Warrant a New Trial Under Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "both the granting of, and the refusing to grant, a

new trial is a matter left to the discretion of the trial judge . .. ." Chnstenson v. Jewkes, 761 P 2d
1375, 1377 (Utah 1988) Howevei, before a court may exercise its disci etion m granting a new
trial, the moving party must present "a showing of one of the grounds specified in Rule 59 of the
1

Jiau Ku;es of Civil Procedure ." Tcumiro v. Marrero, 13 Utah 2d 290, 292 n.2 (Utah 196° )
Ruie c(-r,'".v. " *:•.!

:

.

' : . • ; vcedure provides generally that a trial judge may grant a

new rnai for am of ihe folkw nig causes: (1) irregularis in the prnreedings of the court; \2)
misconduct of the jury: (3) accident or surprise; (4) newly discovered evidence; (5) excessive or
inadequate damages; (6) insufficiency of the evidence in justify Ihe verdict; OJ (7) error in law.
I ;/•.;: K •; ;\. I\ 59(a). While defendants have not specifically stated the grounds under Rule
59(a) for which they ~:v; "• " - ^k\, .. a;cv:,:v :n v. meir arguments that they believe the
evidence provided in me original trial was insufficient to justify the verdict.
There ii MM question th.ii il is the responsibility of the trial judge to determine the
credibility of the witnesses and the facts provided by them. Sic;*' • --•<'''''

»»• "

,-; zil

II »o •/ ../c ;;>}•; MMC i. Hjnuit. .4- P.3d 589, 593 (citingPeople v \'Jayhern\ 542 P.2d 1337,
1342 (Cal. 1975) ("[I]t is the exclusive p-.-^---- •:'•"«• ' - f ' ; . . i : \ .

.: : v determine the

credibility oi a witness.")). Additionally', the Utah Supreme Court has heid mat the finding of
whether an easement exists is "Ihe lype of highly Liu-dependent question, with numerous
potential fact patterns, which accords the trial judge a broad measure of discretion when applying
the correct legal st:!:\::-

... , .\ en sei oi

UICLS.

^*non v. Carter, 970 P.2d 1254, 1256 (Utah

19%). fnough defendams ciain- that xh-c testimony of plaintiffs witnesses is insufficient to
:\v-r\ *h

_: u.„. ^ ^...ncniL eMocnce standard necessary to grant a prescriptive easement,

Marchant v. Park City, 111 P.2d 677, 682 (Utah Ct. App, I W>) Ju,).,,. i>M||tlll v„ a s

in

[|]t. best

position to make that determination.
In Judge Pullan's November 28, 200\ niliii" ("hereinafter Hie ruling" ), he acknowledges
that the testimony of defendants' witnesses was direct!}7 contradicted by testimony from
plaintiffs witnesses, Puling, pp.

;

! (). Said differently, judge J'ullan was not able to harmonize
2

the testimony of the various witnesses of the parties. However, after weighing the evidence and
credibility of the witnesses, Judge Pullan concluded that plaintiff had successfully proven the
elements of a prescriptive easement by "clear and convincing evidence." Ruling, p. 12.
Referring to one of plaintiff s witnesses, Judge Pullan noted that "the testimony of Mr. Eldon
Carlisle . . . was particularly credible." Ruling, p. 13. However, referring to the testimony of one
of defendants' witnesses, Judge Pullan stated, "the weight of the evidence demonstrates clearly
and convincingly otherwise." Ruling, p. 12.
That contradictory evidence was presented throughout the trial does not mean that the
evidence in favor of granting the prescriptive easement was not clear and convincing. Every trial
contains contradictory evidence. That is the nature of the adversarial legal system. It is the
primary responsibility of the trial judge to weigh and judge the credibility of competing witness
testimony and to make decisions thereon. Defendants' "sincere and compelling belief that the
trial judge made an incorrect ruling does not warrant a new trial.
Defendants' second challenge is that Judge Pullan's involvement with the Heber City
Planning Commission with respect to this property warrants a new trial. Though neither party
addressed Judge Pullan's involvement with the Heber City Planning Commission in great detail
in their memoranda, it appears from oral argument that his involvement as a member of the
planning commission did not create a bias or prejudice which justifies a new trial in this matter.
As Chainnan of the planning commission, Judge Pullan was one of several members of that body
who dealt with the issue of plaintiff s property. He did not act alone. Additionally, at the
beginning of the trial Judge Pullan remembered his previous involvement with plaintiffs
property and asked the parties if they objected to his trying the case. At that time, neither party
objected. Having failed to object at that time, when the issue was squarely addressed to the
3

parses o\ . ' u ^ . uui.au. plaintiff cannot now be beard to complain. Judge Pullaivs previous
involvement wr* m''•>'" **"""•
2.

M

r" OOJ n.- * : -ant a new trial.

Defendants Are Not I tititled To Be Relieved From or Amend the .Inclement HiKcd
on

..t's ni t ivii Procedure ,

Rule 60('b» of the i hah Rules of Civil Procedure states six reasons for which a party may
L - rA\j\ ec non j augmenu While the first five reasons deal with specific circumstances and
events, the sixth reason serves as :• v.-<\ v •-

hie .--. ,r;a;r r •„.,. ;. . uity may be relieved from

judgment for "any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment."

UTAH

R.

Civ. P. 00fb)(()) Sine,' defendants have not alleged any of the first five clauses of Rule 60(b),
the court must assume that they intend to gain relief from the judgment based on the residi ia.j y
clause of Rule (>()(h)(6).
The Utah Supreme Court has held that the residuan clause loinul in Rule 00(b)(0)
"embodies three requirements: First, that the reason be one other than those listed in subdivisions
(1) through [(5)]; second, that the reason justify relief; and ihircl thai the motion be made within
a reasonable time." Lauh v South Central Vuxh Telephone Ass'n, 657 P.2d 1304, 1307.
Defendants ciea:*'* ' - . .

.u.pm

• ; ;•:.;•

_K. :uir^ requirements established by the Utah

Supreme Court. However, defendants have not complied with the second requirement because
fu': "'.:'• i),'n>. (• -vo:: •:. ::v..? i, state a reason that justifies relief. Defendants*'"sincere and
compelling belief thai piainiiff ir- fact did not use the lane in the manner asserted by plaintiff;witnesses and found b\ the Court" is insufficient to justify relief Instead, it appears that
defendants are attempting to use Rule 60(b) as an appeal to the trial coi irt from the court's own
ruling and judgment. Defendants had their opportunity at trial to show that plaintiff did not use
the lane in the manner asserted h\ plaintiffs witnesses, but failed, satisfactorily to do so. After
4

both parties presented their case, Judge Pullan found in plaintiffs favor with regard to the
prescriptive easement. Defendants simply have no reason which justifies amending or relieving
them from the judgment.
Conclusion
I deny defendants' motion. Pursuant to Rule 7(f)(2), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
plaintiffs counsel is directed to prepare an appropriate order.
Dated this _[_i day of November, 2006.

BY THE COURT:

UicTmlt A?

ANTHONY W S C H O F f f i M ^ B g l ^ M '
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I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was mailed to the
following, postage prepaid, this •' u> day of November. 2'<<•)(::

Randy B. Birch
Attorney for Plaintiff
139 East South Temple Street, Suite 320
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Kraig J. Powell
Attorney for Defendants
2 South Main Street, Suite 2-D
Heber City, Utah 84032

LORI WOFFINDEN
CLERK OF THE COURT

By M. X'XnA^kiAfVUM
Deputy Clerk
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Lance's Motion to Disqualify Judge and for New Trial. Pursuant to
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RANDY B BIRCH
ATTORNEY PLA
139 E S TEMPLE STE 320
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
KRAIG J POWELL
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(IMPKraig J. Powell (8929)
Shawn W.Potter (9551)
TESCH LAW OFFICES, P.C.
314 Main Street, Suite 200
P.O. Box 3390
Park City, Utah 84060
Telephone: (435) 649-0077
Facsimile: (435) 649-2561
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GARTH LUNT, trustee of the GARTH O.
LUNT REVOCABLE TRUST,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff/Appellee,
V

Civil No.: 020500612
HAROLD LANCE and DIANE LANCE
Judge: Derek P. Pullan
Defendant/Appellant.

Notice is hereby given that Defendants/Appellants, Harold and Diane Lance, by and
through their counsel, Tesch Law Offices, P.C, appeal to the Utah Supreme Court the final
judgment in the above-captioned matter, entered May 11, 2006. The time for appeal was
extended by Defendants' timely filing of their motion for new trial or in the alternative to
amend judgment or take additional testimony. Defendants also appeal the trial court's

Order denying Defendants' Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative to Amend Judgment
and/or Take Additional Testimony, entered December 18, 2006.
This Appeal is made by the above-named Defendants/Appellants who are
represented by:
Kraig J. Powell
Shawn W. Potter
Tesch Law Offices, P.C.
314 Main Street, #200
P.O. Box 3390
Park City, UT 84060-3390
The Plaintiff/Appellee, Garth Lunt, is represented by:
Randy B. Birch
Bostwick & Price
139 East South Temple #320
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

DATED this

^

day of December, 2006.
Respectfully Submitted,
TESCH LAW OFFICES, P.C.

Kraig J. Powell
Shawn W. Potter
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this J ^ j ^ d a y of December, 2006,1 caused to be mailed in
the U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the Notice of Appeal to the
following:
Randy Birch
Bostwick & Price
139 East South Temple St #320
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Kraig J. Powell (8929)
Shawn W.Potter (9551)
TESCH LAW OFFICES, P.C.
314 Main Street, Suite 200
P.O. Box 3390
Park City, Utah 84060
Telephone: (435) 649-0077
Facsimile: (435) 649-2561
Attorneys for Defendant/Appellant

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR WASATCH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
GARTH LUNT, trustee of the GARTH O.
LUNT REVOCABLE TRUST,
AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL
Plaintiff/Appellee,
v.
Civil No.: 020500612
HAROLD LANCE and DIANE LANCE
Judge: Derek P. Pullan
Defendant/Appellant.

Notice is hereby given that Defendants/Appellants, Harold and Diane Lance, by and
through their counsel, Tesch Law Offices, P.C, appeal to the Utah Supreme Court the final
judgment in the above-captioned matter, entered May 11, 2006. The time for appeal was
extended by Defendants' timely filing of their motion for new trial or in the alternative to
amend judgment or take additional testimony. Defendants appeal the trial court's Order
denying Defendants' Motion for New Trial or in the Alternative to Amend Judgment

and/or Take Additional Testimony, entered December 18, 2006. The Plaintiffs also appeal
the trial court's order denying Plaintiffs Motion to Disqualify Judge and for New Trial,
entered April 27, 2006.
This Appeal is made by the above-named Defendants/Appellants who are
represented by:
Kraig J. Powell
Shawn W. Potter
Tesch Law Offices, P.C.
314 Main Street, #200
P.O. Box 3390
Park City, UT 84060-3390
The Plaintiff/Appellee, Garth Lunt, is represented by:
Randy B. Birch
Bostwick & Price
139 East South Temple #320
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

DATED this

*<->
*

day of January, 2007.
Respectfully Submitted,
TESCH LAW OFFICES, P.C.

Kraig^T. Powell
Shawn W. Potter
Attorneys for Defendants/Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this

°

day of January, 2007,1 caused to be mailed in the

U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the Notice of Appeal to the
following:
Randy Birch
Bostwick & Price
139 East South Temple St #320
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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